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Abstract—The possibility of latency arbitrage in financial
markets has led to the deployment of high-speed communication
links between distant financial centers. These links are noisy and
so there is a need for coding. In this paper, we develop a game-
theoretic model of trading behavior where two traders compete to
capture latency arbitrage opportunities using binary signalling.
Different coding schemes are strategies that trade off between
reliability and latency. When one trader has a better channel,
the second trader should not compete. With statistically identical
channels, we find there are two different regimes of channel noise
for which: there is a unique Nash equilibrium yielding ties; and
there are two Nash equilibria with different winners.
“One guy says to me, ‘It doesn’t matter if I’m one second slower
or one microsecond; either way I come in second place.”’
— Flash Boys: A Wall Street Revolt [1, p. 63]
I. INTRODUCTION
The traditional view in information theory is that commu-
nication reliability is to be obtained by paying a penalty in
latency. Though there is growing interest in finite blocklength
information theory [2]–[4], motivated by general notions that
latency is problematic, few works have put forth explicit
reasons for needing to meet latency constraints, cf. [5].
When there are latency arbitrage opportunities in financial
markets, however, latency is a key performance metric [6].
One must be faster than one’s competitors. Indeed, the speed
of light is a key constraint and physical distance a key consid-
eration when building communication channels, whether fiber
optic or microwave [1], [7].
When prices of the same financial instrument in different
financial markets (say Chicago and New York) diverge for
a short period of time, this is called a latency arbitrage
opportunity. Low-latency traders jump in and trade away
the price discrepancies. As an example, a low-latency trader
would sell pork bellies in the market where the commodity
is temporarily overpriced, while simultaneously buying it in
the distant market where the commodity trades too cheaply.
In the process, the demand and supply produced by the low-
latency trader equilibrates market prices in markets that were
previously divergent. Then, the low-latency trader quickly
reverses his position to capture the gain, and investors of
all frequencies can be assured that prices on traded financial
instruments are consistent across the globe, upholding what is
called the law of one price [6].
What are the communication requirements for a latency
arbitrageur? Some unreliability is allowable since there is not
a need for perfect information to make riskless profits; there
is only need to skew the odds systematically in one’s favor [1,
p. 74]. A recent article noted [8]:
that high-frequency traders would much rather have
access to a communications channel that’s faster
than every one else’s, even if it gets flaky every now
and then. A link that’s second or third fastest isn’t
of much use to them, even if it’s always available.
That’s a very different calculus than the one most
engineers use–but it’s clearly the one you want to
follow if you’re trying to get ahead of the pack.
Designing for such novel requirements suggests new problems
at the intersection of communication theory and game theory,
and provides a concrete reason to step back from infinity. Some
previous work on low-latency communication did not consider
the competitive nature of the communication [9].
One should be careful not to confuse low-latency trading
with “high-frequency trading.” Low-latency refers to the abil-
ity to quickly route and execute orders irrespective of their
position-holding time, whereas high-frequency refers to the
fast turnover of capital that may require low-latency execution
capability [6]. Although academic study of low-latency trading
has been limited, Moallemi and Sag˘lam put forth three main
reasons for wanting low latency in trading [10]:
1) Staleness: A trader with significant latency will make
trading decisions based on information that is stale.
2) Relative Latency: A trader will want to act to exploit
a discrepancy before a price correction takes place, i.e.
before competitors are able to act.
3) Ordering: Modern markets treat orders differentially
based on time of arrival.
They focus on a model that captures staleness, but do not
consider relative latency. The goal herein is to look at relative
latency through a mathematical model of repetitive binary
signalling that is essentially a decoding game, where decoding
time is the strategy.
Our main results show that when one trader has a better
channel, the second trader should not compete. With sta-
tistically identical channels, we find there are two different
regimes of channel noise for which: there is a unique Nash
equilibrium yielding ties; and there are two Nash equilibria
with different winners, respectively. A question commonly
asked by market participants and regulators alike is how
much speed is enough? Clearly, the race for speed will end
when there is equilibrium: when an additional dollar spent on
technology no longer generates extra return [6]. Our results
also take steps to answering this question.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We put forth a stylized model of low-latency trading.
A. Arbitrage Payoffs
Let us assume there are two firms A and B who want to
exploit latency arbitrage between markets I and II. Both firms
have agents in both markets. There is a single commodity
under consideration and the values of trades are fixed. Hence
there are just two types of messages: “Buy” and “Sell”.1 The
message is transmitted by the agent of each firm in market I.
The agents in market II try to recover their message correctly
with high probability and as fast as possible. Payoffs are
determined by the order in which the firms act. So we describe
payoffs accordingly.
• First Firm: The first firm to act in market II based on its
estimate of the message has the following payoffs:
– If the transmitted message is “Buy,” and the agent
in market II correctly recovers it, the firm earns V1
dollars. If the agent makes a mistake and assumes
the transmitted message was a “Sell,” the firm loses
V1 dollars (i.e., the payoff is −V1 dollars).
– If the transmitted message is “Sell,” and the agent
in market II correctly recovers it, the firm earns V2
dollars. If the agent makes a mistake and assumes
the transmitted message was a “Buy,” the firm loses
V2 dollars (i.e., the payoff is −V2 dollars).
• Second Firm: Since we assume the market has equili-
brated after the first transaction, the second firm decoding
the message will have zero payoff whether or not it
recovers the message correctly.
• Simultaneous Decoding: If both firms perform decoding
and act upon it at the same time, each of them receives
half of the payoff that the first firm would receive.
• Efficient Market: We assume that after time T0, the
market becomes efficient through the action of high-
latency traders and the arbitrage opportunity disappears.
We assume the prior probabilities P1 and P2 for the messages
“Buy” and “Sell,” where P1 + P2 = 1. Furthermore, each
transaction has a cost for any firm since there are real costs
associated with accessing an exchange, ranging from payment
for direct market feeds to managing routing logic: we assume a
cost of c dollars per transaction. Further, we assume that each
firm pays dS dollars to use a channel with signal-to-noise
ratio S; this is a linear function of signal power as in most
physical communication transmitters. The maximum signal-
to-noise ratio of the channel is S0.
Clearly, this is a first step towards modeling the payoffs
in high-speed trading in financial markets. There are other
possible ways to model payoffs depending on the market under
consideration.
1In the real system, messages are transmitted via a Financial Information
eXchange (FIX) protocol. A typical FIX message is composed of a header, a
body containing order execution directives, and a checksum [11].
B. Strategy Space
The strategy space of each firm is a nonnegative integer,
denoted by TA and TB , respectively which is the delay in
before decoding the message. Specifically, the decision time
of firm A, TA, and the decision time of firm B, TB are the
times when the agents in market II of each firm decide to
decode the message and act based on their estimates of the
transmitted message. The fundamental speed-accuracy tradeoff
can be parameterized by T : the larger the decoding delay for
a firm, the smaller probability of error it has on average. Thus,
the expected payoff would be higher, if it is the first firm to
decode and act. But as the delay increases, it gets less likely
for a firm to be the first actor.
C. Communication Scheme
For concreteness, let us suppose that we are communicating
over a discrete-time AWGN channel with power constraint P .
The noise power is assumed to be N0, so that the signal-to-
noise ratio of the channel is S = P/N0.
We assume that each agent in market I uses binary phase-
shift keying (BPSK) repetition coding. Admittedly, this is a
very simple model of the communication channel and coding
scheme. But we believe that studying this model captures the
essence of the latency-accuracy tradeoff that is of interest to us.
If the message is “Buy,” the agent sends +a into the AWGN
channel; the received symbol is a normally-distributed random
variable N (+a,N0). Similarly, if the message is “Sell,” the
agent sends −a into the AWGN channel; the received symbol
is a normally-distributed random variable N (−a,N0). The
power constraint implies the optimal choice a =
√
P .
The agent at market II estimates the transmitted message
after receiving T symbols, y1, . . . , yT . The sufficient statistic
of the received symbols is 1
T
∑T
i=1 yi. The decoder compares
this sufficient statistic with a chosen threshold, h. The optimal
method to choose the threshold will be discussed later. Thus,
optimal decoding is:
1
T
T∑
i=1
yi
Buy
R
Sell
h
√
P
There are two types of error events:
• If the transmitted message was “Buy” and the decoder
decided “Sell,” we have the error event of type 1. The
probability of this error event is:
Pe,1 = P(error|Buy)
= P(
1
T
T∑
i=1
yi < h
√
P |Buy)
= Q(T
a− h√P√
TN0
) = Q(
√
T
P
N0
(1− h)2)
= Q(
√
2TSγ1) ≈ exp(−TSγ1)
where Q(·) is the cumulative distribution function of the
standard normal distribution, and
γ1 = (1 − h)2/2. (1)
• If the transmitted message was “Sell” and the decoder
decided “Buy,” we have the error event of type 2. The
probability of this error event is:
Pe,2 = P(error|Sell)
= P(
1
T
T∑
i=1
yi > h
√
P |Sell)
= Q(T
a+ h
√
P√
TN0
) = Q(
√
T
P
N0
(1 + h)2)
= Q(
√
2TSγ2) ≈ exp(−TSγ2)
where
γ2 = (1 + h)
2/2. (2)
D. Expected Payoff
• Expected payoff of the first firm: As mentioned, with
probability P1 the transmitted message is “Buy” and with
probability P2, it is “Sell”. The first firm decodes the
transmitted message based on its own estimation of the
message and makes a transaction (and therefore pays the
transaction fee of c dollars). Thus, the expected payoff
of the first firm is as following:
E[payoff of first firm]
= E[payoff|being first]− c− dS
= P1E[payoff|message is Buy and first]
+ P2E[payoff|message is Sell and first]− c− dS
= P1 [(1 − Pe,1)V1 + Pe,1(−V1)]
+ P2 [(1− Pe,2)V2 + Pe,2(−V2)]− c− dS
= P1V1(1− 2Pe,1) + P2V2(1− 2Pe,2)− c− dS
≈ P1V1[1− 2e−TSγ1 ] + P2V2[1− 2e−TSγ2 ]− c− dS
• Expected payoff of the second firm: The expected payoff
of the second firm is −dS regardless of its decoding
probability of error, since the payoff of the transaction
is zero. The second firm does not pay the transaction fee
as it does not make any transaction.
If the decision time of firms are TA = T and TB , and
also the signal-to-noise ratios are 2Sγ1,A, 2Sγ2,A, 2Sγ1,B and
2Sγ2,B, then the expected payoff of firm A would be:
piA(T, TB)
= I{T < min{TB, T0}}
[
P1V1[1− 2e−TSAγ1,A ]
+ P2V2[1− 2e−TSAγ2,A ]− c− dSA
]
+ I{T = min{TB, T0}}
[
P1V1[1− 2e−TSAγ1,A ]/2
+ P2V2[1− 2e−TSAγ2,A ]/2− c− dSA
]
+ I{T > min{TB, T0}} [−dSA]
and symmetrically for the other firm.
III. OPTIMIZATIONS
Having defined the players, the strategies, and the payoffs
in this standard form game, we can now consider some opti-
mization problems, before turning to questions of equilibria.
A. Optimal Decoding
We study an optimal adaptive decoding strategy in which
the threshold value and tradeoff point between two error types
of the decoder depends on its chosen value of delay.
Let the decoder choose its decoding threshold knowing the
decision time:
h∗A(TA, SA) = argmax
h
P1V1[1− 2e−TASAγ1,A ]
+ P2V2[1− 2e−TASAγ2,A ]
≈ P1V1 − P2V2
P1V1 + (1 − 2TASA)P2V2
Note that this choice of threshold captures the tradeoff appear-
ing due to different expected payoff of transmitted messages.
The decoder can reduce the probability of error given the
message was a “Buy” at the cost of a higher probability of
error for the “Sell” messages.
γ∗1 (T ) = (1− h∗(T, S∗))2/2
γ∗2 (T ) = (1 + h
∗(T, S∗))2/2.
We will also need to define the following functions for use in
equilibrium analysis:
FA(TA)
= P1V1(1− 2Pe,1,A) + P2V2(1− 2Pe,2,A)
≈ P1V1[1− 2e−TAS∗Aγ∗1,A(TA)] + P2V2[1− 2e−TASAγ∗2,A(TA)]
FB(TB)
= P1V1(1− 2Pe,1,B) + P2V2(1− 2Pe,2,B)
≈ P1V1[1− 2e−TBS∗Bγ∗1,B(TB)] + P2V2[1− 2e−TBSBγ∗2,B(TB)]
B. Optimal Power Allocation
The transmitter needs to determine the allocated signal-
to-noise ratio ahead of time before the communication takes
place, since this is typically not adaptable at short timescales.
We further assume the signal-to-noise ratio is determined
not knowing the actual decision time. Thus, the allocated
signal-to-noise ratio is assumed to be optimal for a chosen
decision time. We assume that the chosen decision time which
determines the signal-to-noise ratio is the time market becomes
efficient, T0.
S∗ = arg max
S≤S0
P1V1[1− 2e−T0Sγ1 ]/2
+ P2V2[1− 2e−TSγ2 ]/2− c− dS
where
h∗ =
P1V1 − P2V2
P1V1 + (1− 2T0S)P2V2
and γ1 and γ2 are defined as in (1) and (2).
IV. EQUILIBRIA
Now we consider Nash equilibria for the game. We observe
that the expected payoff of firm A when it chooses the optimal
decoder is the following:
piA(TA, TB) = I{TA < min{TB, T0}} [FA(TA)− c− dSA]
+ I{TA = min{TB, T0}} [FA(TA)/2− c− dSA]
+ I{TA > min{TB, T0}} [−dSA] (3)
Since FA(TA) is a strictly increasing function, given TB
and T0, the optimal strategy for firm A is as follows:
T ∗A(TB) =


TB + 1, c ≥ max{FA(TB − 1), FA(TB)/2}
TB − 1, FA(TB − 1) ≥ max{c, FA(TB)/2}
TB, FA(TB)/2 ≥ max{FA(TB − 1), c}
(4)
Similarly for firm B. Now we try to find the equilibrium of
this game in the symmetric case. In this scenario, the functions
FA(·) and FB(·) behave similarly.
We are interested in identifying the long-term behavior of
the system when this game is repeated many times. Thus, we
assume the agents follow the best response dynamics defined
as follows: the game is repeated many times and each firm at
each repetition of the game chooses the best strategy based
on the strategy of the competitor in the previous repetition.
Conditioned on the monotonicity of the payoff function, when
there exists a Nash equilibrium in the game, the best response
dynamics converges [12].
We observe we can expect two types of behavior from
this game depending on the regime in which parameters are
defined:
TIE For some T ∗, there is Nash equilibrium (TA, TB) =
(T ∗, T ∗) and (TA, TB) = (T ∗, T ∗). This is a valid Nash
equilibrium of the game if the following properties hold:
F (T ∗)/2 ≥ max{F (T ∗ − 1), c} (5)
WIN For some T ∗, we have two Nash equilibria (TA, TB) =
(T ∗ + 1, T ∗) and (TA, TB) = (T ∗, T ∗ + 1). This is
a valid Nash equilibrium of the game if the following
properties hold:

c ≤ F (T ∗) ≤ 2c
F (T ∗ + 1) ≤ 2F (T ∗)
F (T ∗ − 1) ≤ c
(6)
We first show that the TIE conditions and the WIN conditions
partition the possibilities. Note that the monotonicity condition
of the lemma is clearly true under optimal decoding: more ob-
servations lead to lower error probabilities and higher expected
payoffs.
Lemma 1. Let us assume function F (·) is strictly increasing
and F (0) < c < F (T0). Then there exists a 0 < T ∗ < T0
that satisfies either the condition set given in equation (5) or
the condition set given in equation (6).
Proof: Let us look at T ∗ such that F (T ∗ − 1) ≤ c <
F (T ∗). We can observe simply that if F (T ∗) > 2c, then
F (T ∗)/2 ≥ max{F (T ∗ − 1), c}. Similarly if F (T ∗ + 1) >
2F (T ∗), then F (T ∗ + 1)/2 ≥ max{F (T ∗), c}
Now we prove the equilibrium properties under the TIE and
WIN conditions, respectively.
Theorem 1. Suppose that both agents start the game for some
(TA, TB), the repeated game under the best response dynamics
converges to one of the possible Nash equilibria. If the set of
conditions given in equation (5) is satisfied for some T ∗, the
agents converge to simultaneous decoding at time T ∗. If the
set of conditions given in equation (6) is satisfied for some T ∗,
depending on the starting point, they converge to (TA, TB) =
(T ∗, T ∗ + 1) or (TA, TB) = (T
∗ + 1, T ∗).
Proof: We can construct the best response state graph of
the game. Each state in this graph corresponds to one possible
strategy set. The transitions correspond to better/best responses
of any one of the players to the strategy given in the previous
state (in each transition, we assume that only one player can
change its strategy). The transitions could be determined from
the equations given in (4). The pure state Nash equilibria of
a game is the sink states of this state graph as no player can
unilaterally improve his payoff in these states. the sink states
of this state graph. We could have two possible types of state
graphs depending which of these equations (5) and (6) are
satisfied. Due to the monotonicity of the function F (·), in any
case this state graph is acyclic and starting from any state, it
converges to one of the sink states.
Notice that the TIE conditions specify that the payoff in-
creases faster than exponentially as a function of time, whereas
the WIN conditions specify that the payoff increases slower
than exponentially as a function of time. Since the quality of
the channel determines the rate at which the error probability
decays/ payoff increases, it seems that the stronger channels
would impose the TIE result between the agents, whereas the
weaker channels would impose inequality in the results of the
game.is possible to win a trading race (in equilibrium) when
the channel is not so noisy.
V. NON-IDENTICAL CHANNELS
Thus far we have been discussing games where the noise
powers for the two players are identically N0. For complete-
ness, let us state what happens when the channels do not have
identical statistics. If different firms have channels of different
quality, the signal-to-noise ratio and the optimal transmitted
power would be different for each firm. The expected payoff of
each firm still follows the equation (3). The Nash equilibrium
of this game will be asymmetric in the following sense. Let
us assume that F−1B (c) < F
−1
A (c). The equilibrium will be
(TA, TB) = (⌊F−1A (c)⌋ + 1, ⌊F−1A (c)⌋). This equilibrium is
intuitive as we expect the firm with the better (or cheaper)
communication channel to be more powerful and exploit
the arbitrage in the market. This is what is observed with
an incredibly expensive arms race to build better physical
communication channels.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have formulated a stylized model of the communication
race that forms the heart of low-latency trading to take advan-
tage of latency arbitrage opportunities in financial markets.
We found the existence of Nash equilibrium communication
strategies: for one set of channel parameters, there is a unique
equilibrium that corresponds to ties where the two firms
share the arbitrage opportunity. For another set of channel
parameters, there are two possible equilibrium when one or
the other firm wins the opportunity.
Our modeling approach cast time as discrete, but one
might wonder what happens in continuous-time models of
communication races. Rather than settling into Nash equilibria,
best response dynamics may go into a limit cycle since it is
possible to just act more quickly than one’s opponent; the
discontinuity prevents equilibria for the real-valued strategy
space. Even within a discrete-time model that comes from
continuous time, the relationship between clocking speed and
noise could make clocking a part of the strategy space.
Herein we have used various simplifications that can be
relaxed in future work. We can consider markets with more
than two messages; advanced methods in coding theory would
then become important rather than simply having BPSK repe-
tition. Moreover, microwave links that are now deployed incur
fading in addition to noise; the role of outage in trading could
be intriguing. Considering the game with many competitive
firms rather than just two is another possible extension to the
basic framework.
Finally, we have focused here on expected payoffs, as
is typical in game theory, but in many financial settings,
risk is also a strong consideration. By considering risk in
addition to expected payoff as part of performance criteria,
new optimizations and equilibria may arise.
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